Abstract
A significant increase in grid connection requests from industrial customers has lead to long connection queues. Combined with long lead times on grid construction, the result is significant socioeconomic losses due to lack of grid capacity. Distribution system operators (DSO) have therefore introduced non-firm connections as an alternative, where the new grid customer may connect on the condition that the DSO retains the right to disconnect the grid customer if necessary. An option to potential disconnection is for customers to leverage flexibility to stay below an agreed capacity level. Unfortunately, many existing grid customers possess flexibility potential but lack incentives to utilise it. To address this, we propose a “coordinated non-firm connection”, where the new grid customer forms an energy community with existing grid customers to coordinate flexibility and capacity utilisation. To demonstrate technical feasibility and incentive compatibility, we formulate a complementarity model. Applying this model to a case study involving three industrial grid customers, we showcase both technical potential and incentive compatibility. Results illustrate how energy community members engage in capacity trading within a local market, ensuring adherence to grid limitations. The game theory-based model confirms sufficient economic benefit for all members to participate.