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QKD Security in Practice: A Systematization of Infrastructure-Level Threats and Defenses

Abstract

Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) is regarded as providing information-theoretic security guaranteed by the laws of quantum mechanics. However, a substantial body of practical attacks shows that deployed QKD systems can be compromised without violating these principles, by exploiting weaknesses in devices, control processes, and system integration. This paper presents a Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) on the system and infrastructure security of QKD deployments. We analyze 81 research works and develop a unified taxonomy together with an assumption-based model that explains attacks as violations of a small set of shared system assumptions spanning transmitters, channels, receivers, and classical infrastructure.Our central finding is that practical QKD security is limited not by the absence of defenses, but by the absence of system-level assurance. Existing work strengthens individual components but does not ensure that these protections guarantee end-to-end security. This creates an assurance gap: local defenses exist, yet there is no reliable way to confirm that system-wide assumptions remain valid in real deployments. We show that attacks follow recurring mechanisms and that infrastructure dependencies remain fragmented. Taken together, this work reframes QKD security as a system-level assurance problem driven by engineering realities, essential for hybrid QKD and post-quantum cryptography (PQC) architectures/quantum-safe infrastructures.

Category

Academic chapter

Language

Other

Author(s)

Affiliation

  • SINTEF Digital / Software Engineering, Safety and Security
  • Norwegian University of Science and Technology

Date

01.06.2026

Year

2026

Publisher

IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers)

Book

2026 IEEE Symposium on Computers and Communications (ISCC)

ISBN

9798319534521

Page(s)

1 - 6

View this publication at Norwegian Research Information Repository