

A composite background image featuring a snowy mountain range, a city skyline, a suspension bridge, an airplane in flight, and an offshore oil rig in the sea.

# AUTOMATION OF THE RAIL – REMOVING THE HUMAN FACTOR?

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ESREL 2018, 17-21 June, Trondheim, Norway

# Introduction

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## **SAREPTA project (2017 – 2021)**

- Focuses on systems that are autonomous, remotely controlled and/or periodically not manned
- Road, sea, aviation and rail

## **Purpose**

To describe current **rail** accidents as a basis for questioning whether future digitalisation will improve safety

## **Outline**

- Current rail accidents
- Autonomy and levels of automation
- Safety potential of future automation
- Do automation remove the human factor?

# Current rail accidents

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
## Automated metros

No significant accidents reported

## Main line railways

- *Fatal train accidents* (five or more killed) have declined in Europe since 1980
- *Types of accidents: Persons killed/injured in Europe (Eurostat 2017)*
  1. Rolling stock in motion
  2. Level-crossings  
... followed by ...
  3. Collisions
  4. Derailments

# Autonomy and Grades of automation



**ERMTS**

**(European Railway Traffic Management System)**

Common signalling system to be introduced in all EU countries by 2030

**Autonomous metros  
(Unattended Train Operation – UTO)**

- *May automation prevent future rail accidents?*
- *How can new technology contribute?*

# Fully automated metro

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- Closed off networks (e.g. run underground)
- No points where train cross with others
- Station area strongly marked
- Platform screen doors

# Rolling stock in motion




- People along the track, at platforms, working at the track, fall from vehicle



- Animals along the track (reindeer, horses, moose etc)

# Technology development




## People

- Obstacle detection
- Regenerative braking
- Monitoring systems
- Satellite based positioning systems



## Animals

- Acoustic signals (fearing animals)




# Level crossings



- Signalling/  
dispatching error

Often **road user**  
errors or violations:


- Obeying warnings
- Situational awareness



# Technology development



- Obstacle detection in cars and trains
- Alarms
- Regenerative braking
- Real time management of signals and yard



# Collisions



Åsta, Norway 2000



South Carolina, USA  
February, 2018

- Most often signal passed at danger
- Wrong track
- Signal error

# Technology development



- Obstacle detection
- Traction transformers
- Regenerative braking  
(be aware of passenger safety and comfort)
- Monitoring systems
- Satellite based positioning systems



# Derailment

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## Spain 2013

High-speed train at  
180km/h in a curve

Human error?

- Driver should manually have switched off, but was speaking on the phone
- ERMTS-1, but the ETCS (European Train Control System) was switched off

# Technology development

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
## EMTS level 1 should have:

- a) Text message at the dashboard
- b) Yellow flashing text
- c) After 5 sec.: braking continuously




# Automation – Removing "human failure"?

*Less human dependability?*



Grades of automation	Responsibility	
		
<b>GoA-1</b> Manual operation	<b>Drivers</b>	Guide assist
<b>GoA-2</b> Semi-automated control with driver	Monitors all time	Manage movements within limits
<b>GoA-3</b> Automated driving with on-board staff	Ready to take back control	Drives itself, may give back control
<b>GoA-4</b> Fully automated driving	Not required	<b>All time</b>

# Conclusion - Do automation remove the human factor?



## Outer control loop

**Context** - open surroundings is a challenge, but technology may improve safety (many pilots)

**Management Centre** necessary

**Risks:** Technical failure, humans at the track, telecommunication overload, maintenance detection etc

## Too much emphasize on new technology?

- Unexpected events will occur (Black swans)
- Humans may prevent incidents becoming catastrophes
- R&D and pilots are necessary (e.g. resilience)

## On-board personnel

- Recognize abnormal situations
- Prepared to take manual control (training)
- Evacuation procedure training

## Management centre:

- Surveillance
- Remote control (in case of failures)
- Evacuation management
- Service to the public

**Thank you!**

Questions?