



# Turning failures into a benefit for everyone

HUMAN FACTORS IN CONTROL

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**English translation:**

"It is unfortunately so that a majority of our strandings and shipwrecks are due to poor navigation or lack of responsibility and vigilance from the officers - partly also insufficient experience and lack of conduct."

*"Det er vistnok desværre saa,  
at en Flerhed af vore  
Strandinger og Forlis skyldes  
slet Navigering eller Mangel  
paa Ansvarfølelse og  
Paapasselighed fra de  
Befalhavendes Side, - delvis  
ogsaa utilstrekkelig Erfaring og  
Manglende Konduite"*

**A.R., Bergen 15. Juni 1907**

## LEVEL 1: WHAT CAN BE OBSERVED

The speak-up policy is implemented

The captain has the overriding authority

Safety officers ensure compliance

A speak-up procedure is implemented

## LEVEL 2: WHAT IS EXPRESSED - OFTEN AS THE TRUTH

"Safety and Environment is our first priority!"

"We all follow all the rules"

"It is important to be proactive!"

"We have a no-blame policy"

## LEVEL 3: WHAT DETERMINES BEHAVIOR – UNDERLYING ASSUMPTIONS OFTEN TAKEN FOR GRANTED

Our only commitment is to not spend money

We are already good enough - the procedures are only to reduce shore management responsibility

It is only a few idiots that cause incidents

If the captain says no – he will be fired

If I report that I have failed, I will be sanctioned

To speak up is an offense to the person in charge

## Imagine this situation:

- Your hard work recently resulted in the job of your dreams.
  - But you are not getting along with your manager.
  - One day this manager gives you a warning on your job performance.
  - You strongly feel that this warning is unjustified and that you are not at fault.
- 
- A few weeks later the manager comes to you and asks: “I know you have never done this task before, I trust that you will make it this time?”.
    - Are you up for the challenge?
  - You soon learn that this task is really difficult.
    - Will you be reluctant to ask your manager for assistance?
  - Suddenly you make a critical mistake. Close call but no harm done.
    - Will you keep quiet about this mistake to your manager?

# 8 groups of underlying assumptions have proved to describe the ability to manage failures




Fallacies related to...

- A: the failure itself
- B: own ability to cope with failure
- C: how you assume other think
- D: fear for others

BEA 548 (1972)	CHERNOBYL (1986)	NASA CHALLENGER (1986)	TEXAS CITY REFINERY (2005)	COSTA CONCORDIA (2012)	CIDADE de SÃO MATEUS (2015)	TORREY CANYON (1967)	DEEPWATER HORIZON (2010)
TRUST	CARE	OPENNESS	LEARN	FEEDBACK	SPEAK-UP	TEAM	DILEMMAS
FALLACIES	FALLACIES	FALLACIES	FALLACIES	FALLACIES	FALLACIES	FALLACIES	FALLACIES
A B C D	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D	A B C D

## Ability to manage failures depend on the culture maturity – the aim is to move the culture to the right

Score (in %)	<25	25-50	50-75	75-99	>99
	FOURTH QUARTILE	THIRD QUARTILE	SECOND QUARTILE	TOP QUARTILE	COLLABORATIVE CULTURE
<b>Failures is seen as a sign of ...</b>	carelessness and irresponsible acts of "bad apples"	complacency and incompetence	weak control	a lack of collaboration	a learning opportunity
<b>People who are involved in failures are...</b>	pointed out as scapegoats	blamed and the organization does not take steps to learn from the failure	handled according to an ostensible no-blame process, but may still experience various forms of sanctions	handled in a just way	not stigmatized because the organization recognizes that anybody can make a mistake
...	...	...	...	...	...
...	...	...	...	...	...
<b>Hence, ...</b>	people feel demoralized, the trust in the organization or management is low and people experience low Care from the organization and colleagues	even though the Trust and Care is starting to form, the organization is neither Open nor able to Learn from failures	mistakes are hidden and failures are rationalized – which influence the honesty in Feedback and the ability to Speak-up about concerns that have an interpersonal dimension (which is often a component of failures)	shared interest prevails over self-interest and management of dilemmas and organizational learning is more effective	learning from failure and continuous improvement are core values



Trying? Trying to what? Trying is not what we are here for. We are here to do our jobs. And your job is to look out the window and make sure we don't run into anything. Is that too complicated? Is that too much to ask?


## Digitalized behavioural change

**Top down** for leaders  
80% of successful change

- Growth oriented psychometric **tests**
- On-the-job leadership **missions**
- **XLABs** to get key managers onboard

**Bottom up** for all teams  
80% of the efficiency of change

- Gamified **simulations** to practise behaviours on handheld devices
- Team **reflections** to act on the job







*Thank you!*

## REFERENCES (1 of 2)

The presentation is based on several references presente on this and the next page, whereof the most important are bolded.

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