


Valemon


- Gas and condensate field operated from 2015
- Drilling ongoing from West Elara jackup rig
- To be remotely operated from Sandsli






- Platform deck and assembly in South Korea
- Steel foundation and living quarter from Netherlands
- Equipment packages from Norway

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Main Control Room

- Valemon designed as a *fail safe* process plant with high degree of automation
- Automatic shutdown at loss of communication with MCR
- Sandsli MCR with same user interface as Valemon CCR



Why Sandsli and onshore ?



- Communication logically and physically separated from other net
- Two always up routes
- Designed with cyber security in mind



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Why remote operation?

- Lower OPEX
 - Saves 2 shift at Valemon
- Drives efficient campaignbased maintenance
 - Must fit within #hours on maintenace plan
- Improves Statoil's capability for future concept selections

• Potential to scale Sandsli MCR




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Key issues

- Develop and verify a new operational model
- Ensure safe and efficient operation
- Engineering designed for safe, efficient, and secure operation
- Valemon As Built HF Analysis and specification
- Which changes follow from new operational model



Human factor analysis as a HUB

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Engineering design

- Which requirements apply?
 - NORSOK or TEK 10
- TR's and standards not written with intention to support onshore solutions



CCR in Offshore LQ

Some considerations in design

- Redundancy in support systems such as cooling and power supply
- Security design
- Engineering numbering system



CCR in an onshore office space

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Safety issues

- Maintain safety barriers
- Verify emergency preparedness
- Security in new model
- Impact on health and working environment

Operational barrier: Safetycritical action performed by operating personel

- Are operational and technnical barriers still intact?
- How do we man and plan emergency preperadness in differnt «modes» of operation
- Security challenges with an unmanned installation, cybersecurity for a new network and security for MCR at Sandsli
- Uncomfort entering an unmanned instalaltion
- Suifficient work for operators at Sandsli

 tedious?

9 Classification: Open


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Operation

- Virtual team communication and collaboration through electronic tools
 - Trust
 - Common understanding
 - Distance vs situational awareness
 - Slow rotation vs familiarity
- Uncover complexity, structure communication tasks and identify specification for communication equipment






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Virtual teams and situational awareness

- Telecommunication as Valemon
 - VHF, UHF, telephony, public announcement
- Large screen display with increased real estate for awareness and collaboration
- Valemon has 150+ CCTV cameras
 - Check and report when unmanned
 - Replace the field operator
- Valemon regarded as a simple process plant



Connecting A VR model to CCTV cameras VISCO Creating visuals-making sense

Summary and conclusions

- Firm plan for remote operation and unmanned installation from 2017
- · Solutions can not degrade safety and efficency
- Human factors analysis important to adress operations, engineering design and risk and safety assesment as an integrated solution
- · Technically and operationally feasible
- Done before at Huldra and Sleipner B

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