

DNV·GL

OIL & GAS

# Operational barrier elements

Good practices

**Sondre Øie**  
16 October 2014

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## Contents

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- Sondre Øie
- Framework
- Definitions
- Perspectives
- OBEs
- Examples
- Performance req.
- Summary

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
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## Barrier management in operation: Good practices

- Ordered by the Norwegian Shipowners Association (Norges Rederiforbund)
  - Drifts- og miljøutvalget (DMU)
  - Two 2-day workshops, one comment round, one clarification meeting
  
- Philosophy behind the report:
  - Build on existing practices
  - Take it one step further (e.g. HF)
  - No “moon landing”
  - Practices, incl. examples
  
- Well received by the industry
  
- Available on [www.rederi.no](http://www.rederi.no)



## Framework for barrier management



## Barrier definitions

### Barrier


Barriers refer to measures established with an explicit purpose to (1) prevent a hazard from being realized, or (2) to mitigate the effects of a hazardous event.

### Barrier function

The purpose or role of a barrier.

### Barrier element

Technical, operational or organisational measures which alone or together realize one or several barrier functions.



## The "curse" of accident investigations

Poor supervision contributed to the accident by...

Due to insufficient management of change the crew failed to...

The operator was inexperienced and lacked training...


"Non-physical barriers"

"Soft barriers"

"Non-technical barriers"

Important factors for safety, but should they be managed as barriers?

## The energy-barrier perspective



Rosness (2010), adapted from Haddon (1980)

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## Management Regulations, Section 5 Barriers

Barriers shall be established that:

- a) reduce the probability of failures and hazard and accident situations developing,
- b) Limit possible harm and disadvantages

[...] Personnel shall be **aware** of what barriers have been established and which **function** they are intended to fulfil, as well as what **performance requirements** have been defined in respect of the technical, **operational** or **organizational elements** necessary for the individual barrier to be effective.

[...] Personnel shall be aware of which barriers are **not functioning** or have been **impaired**.

Falling into the trap of comparing



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## Management Regulations, Section 17 Risk analyses and emerge...

[...] Risk analyses shall be carried out to identify and assess **contributions** to major accident, [...]

Risk analyses shall be carried out and form part of the basis for making decisions when e.g.:

- a) identifying the need for and **function** of necessary barriers, with reference to Sections 4 and 5,
- b) identifying specific **performance requirements** of **barrier functions** and **barrier elements**, [...]

Need for a integrated framework, with suitable definitions and methods

## Task-based approach to operational barrier elements





### Operational barrier element


*A task performed by an operator, or team of operators, which realizes one or several barrier functions.*

### Organisational barrier element

*Personnel responsible for, and directly involved in, realizing one or several barrier function.*



## Performance requirements



### Example of requirement for OBE (kick detection):

- Clear instructions shall be given to the Driller for this occurrence, prior to start drilling an oil based mud section:
  - Monitor active pit for small gains (< 5 bbls/0.8m3).
  - Be prepared to shut-in or handle increases in pit volume, when circulating after drilling breaks.
  - Flow checks taken after any kick indicators have been observed, should be extended to between 15 and 30 min. Even with a static flow check, consideration should be given to circulating bottoms-up.
  - Etc.

### Example of requirement for PSF (HMI):

- The RS's BOP control panel shall be equipped minimum as per point 5.2.8 of API Specification 16D, i.e.:
  - Control all functions associated with BOP stack and associated equipment.
  - Display the position status of all functions.
  - Warning lights alarms of all the critical functions.
  - Etc.


## Identify – analyse – establish – follow up



Note that this process is part of an overall barrier analysis

## The Devil is in the details...

- Introducing or not revealing *latent failures*
- Part of barrier performance assurance activities (testing, inspection, maintenance etc.)
- *Safety Critical Tasks (SCTs)*
  - Type A, B, and C
  - Criticality ranking
- Manage through good procedures, mentoring / follow-up, training and workplace design – this is where safety culture and leadership comes in



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## Summary

### Strengths and benefits

- Fits nicely and is in-line with regulations and requirements
- Builds on existing SBM practices
- Not an “add-on” to technical barrier management
- Utilizes well known and tried terminology and methods (task analysis)
- Can be measured and followed up
- Separates apples from oranges
- Much is already in place with the companies through normal practices, just need to link it to the hazards

### Challenges and limitations

- “Bureaucratic” way of managing safety
  - Human error, blame
  - Operator responsible, predominant focus on sharp-end performance
  - “We have everything in place”
- Overly focused on barriers (and not e.g. critical maintenance tasks)
- Does not include social and organizational aspects on a higher level, such as culture, leadership and management systems
  - Should also be managed, but not as part of SBM

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**Thank you!**

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