


The geopolitical situation and security governance of petroleum infrastructure

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Key events and challenges inspiring the project

- → Nord Stream sabotage
- → Drone activity around petroleum platforms
- → High policy security risks → challenging for industry
 1. Regulatory tradition based on decentralising responsibility through self-regulation
 2. Safety oriented risk management approach
 3. Risks that require new risk governance needs in collaboration with new actors



Changes in industry's framework conditions → new risk governance needs

1. Stronger international dimension in risk scenarios
 - More threats of foreign origin
 - International institutions (NATO, EU) claim more prominent role in security governance
2. New regulatory terrain → stronger security focus
 - Transport of gas and control of petroleum production «basic national functions» under the Security Act
 - Gives industry responsibilities in the national security chain → need for company-internal professional adaptation
3. New actors enter the risk governance regime around the petroleum industry
 - Coordination and collaboration needs with more actors at different levels of security governance (non-state, national, international) → traditionally a wicked problem!
 - Need to clarify responsibilities between actors at different levels of governance
4. Push towards *multilevel risk governance* → international (NATO, EU) – national (ministries and directorates responsible for security) – sector/industry





New geopolitics and the interaction between safety and security in petroleum risk governance (INTERSECT)

- → «Knowledge building project for industry», funded by the Norwegian Research Council. Industry funding from Equinor, Gassco and Vår Energi
- → NTNU Social Research AS (lead)
 - Academic partners: UiS (Department of Safety, Economics and Planning), SINTEF Digital
 - Industry partners: Equinor, Gassco and Vår Energi
- → Starts December 1st, 4 yr duration

Objectives

- → Primary objective: To develop knowledge about the challenges and opportunities for security risk governance in and around the petroleum sector.
- → Secondary objectives:
 1. To address how changes in the *external framework conditions* stemming from a new geopolitical situation impact security risk governance in and around the petroleum sector.
 2. To address the *internal conditions* impacting security risk governance within the petroleum sector.

Work packages and research questions

1. WP1 – International events and institutions

RQ1: How do international events and institutions impact security risk governance in and around the petroleum sector?

2. WP2 – New regulation

RQ2: How can the Security Act be implemented in ways compatible with existing regulations and logics of risk governance in and around the petroleum sector?

3. WP3 – Institutions and coordination

RQ3: How does coordination, cooperation and division of responsibility between the petroleum sector and institutions at international and governmental level shape and impact comprehensive risk governance?

4. WP4 – Safety and security cultures

RQ4: How do company-internal specialised division of labour/tasks and potentially divergent cultures and practices of safety and security impact comprehensive risk governance in the petroleum sector?

5. WP5 – Holistic security governance

RQ5: Building on RQ1-RQ4, how can security governance in and around the petroleum sector be improved?

Methodological approach

- → Social science
- → Draws on theories and models from political science, sociology, societal security...
- → Interviews and document studies at the relevant levels of governance (including NATO, EU, relevant national ministries and directorates, supervisory authorities, companies...)
- → We study processes as they unfold = need for adaptability



Safety v. security

- → Implications for the intersection between safety and security *work and organisation* within companies
- → Need for interaction across the ontological, epistemological, professional, communicative and cultural boundaries of safety and security
 - Ontological: Different risks (intended and malicious in security vs. unintended/not malign in safety)
 - Epistemological: Different methods for creating knowledge about risk problems
 - Professional: Differences in educational backgrounds and «ways of doing»
 - Communicative: Differences in transparency (norm of secrecy in [high] security and openness in safety)



There is a need for a holistic approach to risk governance!

1. Comprehensive approach, sees the fuller picture
2. Includes security and safety on (more) equal conditions
3. Differentiation perspective – mutual understanding and recognition of differences rather than integration into one model
4. Designed to fit the multi-level and multi-actor risk governance needs



THANKS FOR THE ATTENTION!

