Application of systems safety principles for O&M of floating offshore wind.

David Rowell, David McMillan, James Carroll

Energy 2934stems

& Structures CDT

















- Safety in offshore wind
- What is systems safety
- Examples
- Applications to FOW

















(Rowell et al., 2024)
















(Rowell et al., 2024) (G+ Global Offshore Wind, 2022)
















(Bilgili and Alphan, 2021)




























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"Safety is an emergent property of a complex system" Leveson 2012













Linear Causality



Where is the root cause?















Emergent Properties



















Software error 'caused Mars lander crash'



Lander crashed after engine shutdown prematurely.

(Leveson, 2012) (Reichhardt, 2000)















Boatswain fell asleep



Doors were not closed



First officer was not on deck to check doors closed



Ferry capsized

(Rasmussen, 1997) (Leveson, 2012)













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


Fig. 2. The complex pattern of the Zeebrugge accident.

(Rasmussen, 1997) (Leveson, 2012)














Engineer who lost arm while working on North Sea wind turbine wins compensation

Danen Hoadley wire compensation from employer Sement Gamesa after losing his armin a 2018 accident installing a wind turbine in the Belgjan North Sea





https://www.energyvoice.com/health-safety-environment/542984/engineer-who-lost-arm-while-working-on-north-sea-wind-turbine-wins-compensation/











IP was told to check safety pins



IP thought system was isolated



No barrier was in place



Made a visual check



Arm trapped and amputated


Darren Hoadley v Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy Ltd (2022)







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Collision between crew transfer vessel and wind turbine generator





https://toolbox.energyinst.org/c/presentations/collision-between-crew-transfer-vessel-and-wind-turbine-generator













Systems

Theoretic

Accident

Model &


Processes

(Leveson, 2012)
















Safety: absence of losses

Loss: could be human life or injury, property damage, loss of generation

Accident: any undesired and unplanned event that results in a loss

(Leveson, 2012)
















(Leveson and Thomas, 2018)














Organisational analysis

1)Define purpose

- Goals
- Requirements
- Hazards
- Constraints

2)Model control structure



3)Gap analysis on control structure



4)Re-design controls



(Leveson and Thomas, 2018)













System Goal SG-1:

Floating wind turbines and infrastructure are designed to provide a safe workplace for persons involved in installing, operating and maintaining them.













System Hazard OH-1:

Lack of integration of safety into the design development of FOW systems leads to losses.













Sc5: Channels for increased supply chain collaboration should be developed.

Sc4: Operations personnel should be included in design development at all stages.

Sc3: Industry level interface guides for key design interfaces should be developed.

SH1: Lack of integration of operational safety into the design during development of FOW systems leads to injuries or loss of people involved in FOW O&M Sc1: Guidelines for standardisation should developed at the earliest stages, without limiting innovation.

Sc2: Safety related technical decision making should be independent from cost and schedule considerations.

(G+ Global offshore wind, 2022)














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Control actions: Legislation Regulations Policies

Feedback:
Accident reports
Near miss reports
Worker engagement














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Example gap analysis:

Requirement – Operations personnel involved in all stages of design development.

Control structure element – Designer, O&M Contractor.

Weakness identified – No formal mechanism for involvement at all stages.




























Applications for FOW

Organisational analysis
Design technical analysis
Operational hazard analysis

SOV operations hazard analysis (Puisa et al., 2021)













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