On the barriers of AI and the trade-off between stability and accuracy in deep learning

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Joint work with:

Ben Adcock (SFU), Nina Gottschling (Cambridge), Anders Hansen (Cambridge), Clarice Poon (Bath), Francesco Renna (Porto)

Geilo Winter School, January 2021

MAIN GOAL

Determine the barriers of computations in deep learning (i.e. what is and what is not possible) \downarrow Stability and Accuracy in AI

Wir müssen wissen - wir werden wissen! — David Hilbert

Some of the results found in (links included):

- Antun, Colbrook and Hansen, 2021. Can stable and accurate neural networks be computed?
 On the barriers of deep learning and Smale's 18th problem. arXiv:2101.08286.
- Gottschling, Antun, Adcock, and Hansen, 2020. The troublesome kernel: why deep learning for inverse problems is typically unstable. arXiv:2001.01258.
- Antun, Renna, Poon, Adcock, and Hansen, 2020. On instabilities of deep learning in image reconstruction and the potential costs of AI. PNAS.

https://github.com/Comp-Foundations-and-Barriers-of-AI

Outline of lectures

DAY I	DAY II	Day III
Gravity of AI	Inverse Problems	Achieving Kernel Awareness
Image Classification	Instabilities & Kernel Awareness	FIRENETs
Need for Foundations	Intriguing Barriers	Imaging Applications
AI for Image Reconstruction	Algorithm Unrolling	Numerical Examples


Slides will be hosted at http://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/user/mjc249/Talks.html. Useful references for further reading in grey boxes.

Comments and suggestions welcome! (vegarant@math.uio.no, m.colbrook@damtp.cam.ac.uk)

Interest in deep learning unprecedented and exponentially growing

Google search (7th Jan) "deep learning" or "machine learning" yields \approx 2.5 billion hits Contrast with "computational mathematics" which has <150 million hits

Machine Learning Arxiv Papers per Year



ML Arxiv Papers – Moore's Law growth rate (2x/2 years)

Figure: Source: 'Deep Learning to Solve Challenging Problems' (Google AI) To keep up last year, you would need to continually read a paper every < 5 mins!

Why is AI suddenly such a big deal?

Deep Learning is changing our lives

AI techniques are replacing humans in problem solving.
AI techniques are replacing established algorithms in science.

Al replacing humans

- Self-driving vehicles
- Automated diagnosis in medicine
- Automated decision processes
- Automated weapon systems
- Music composition
- Call centres
- Any security system based on face or voice recognition
- Amazon's Alexa smart speaker
- Mathematical proofs

Al replacing (and/or enhancing) established algorithms

- Medical imaging (MRI, CT, etc)
- Microscopy
- Imaging problems in general
- Radar, sonar, etc.
- Methods for solving PDEs

The Pioneers



The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) awarded Yoshua Bengio, Geoffrey Hinton and Yann LeCun with what many consider the "Nobel Prize of computing," for the innovations they've made in AL

Citation from the Turing Award jury

Select Technical Accomplishments

The technical achievements of this year's Turing Laureates, which have led to significant breakthroughs in AI technologies include, but are not limited to, the following:


Geoffrey Hinton

<u>Backpropagation</u>: In a 1986 paper, "Learning Internal Representations by Error Propagation," coauthored with David Rumelhart and Ronald Williams, Hinton demonstrated that the backpropagation algorithm allowed neural nets to discover their own internal representations of data, making it possible to use neural nets to solve problems that had previously been thought to be beyond their reach. The backpropagation algorithm is standard in most neural networks today.

<u>Boltzmann Machines</u>: In 1983, with Terrence Sejnowski, Hinton invented Boltzmann Machines, one of the first neural networks capable of learning internal representations in neurons that were not part of the input or output.

<u>Improvements to convolutional neural networks</u>: In 2012, with his students, Alex Krizhevsky and Ilya Sutskever, Hinton improved convolutional neural networks using rectified linear neurons and dropout regularization. In the prominent ImageNet competition, Hinton and his students almost halved the error rate for object recognition and reshaped the computer vision field.

Before and after 2012 - The ImageNet competition



A paradigm shift

Т	op 5 ILSVRC	2012 Results
1st	Error: 16.4%	Deep Learning
2nd	Error: 26.1%	Other approach
3rd	Error: 26.9%	Other approach
4th	Error: 29.5%	Other approach
5th	Error: 34.4%	Other approach
Т	op 5 ILSVRC	2017 Results
1st	Error: 2.3%	Deep Learning
2nd	Error: 2.5%	Deep Learning
3rd	Error: 2.7%	Deep Learning
4th	Error: 3.0%	Deep Learning
5th	Error: 3.2%	Deep Learning

Table: Results from ImageNet Large Scale Visual Recognition Competition (ILSVRC).

Protein folding: open problem since Anfinsen's 1972 Nobel Prize



By Helen Briggs BBC science correspondent

30 November 2020





A DeepMind model of a protein from the Legionnaire's disease bacteria (Casp-14)

One of biology's biggest mysteries has been solved using artificial intelligence, experts have announced.

Predicting how a protein folds into a unique three-dimensional shape has ouzzled scientists for half a century.

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
NEWS - 30 NOVEMBER 2020

'It will change everything': DeepMind's AI makes gigantic leap in solving protein structures

Google's deep-learning program for determining the 3D shapes of proteins stands to transform biology, say scientists.

Ewen Callaway

y (f) 🖻



J., POF version

RELATED ARTICLES

Al protein-folding algorithms solve structures faster than ever



The revolution will not be crystallized: a new method sweeps through structural biology



The computational protein designers



The co design



London-based AI lab, DeepMind, has largely cracked the problem, said the organisers of a scientific challenge.


Protein folding: open problem since Anfinsen's 1972 Nobel Prize

"This computational work represents a stunning advance on the protein-folding problem, a 50-year-old grand challenge in biology. It has occurred decades before many people in the field would have predicted. It will be exciting to see the many ways in which it will fundamentally change biological research."

— Venki Ramakrishnan (2009 Nobel Prize in Chemistry, President of the Royal Society 2015–2020)

STRUCTURE SOLVER

DeepMind's AlphaFold 2 algorithm significantly outperformed other teams at the CASP14 proteinfolding contest — and its previous version's performance at the last CASP.



Al techniques replace doctors

FDA NEWS RELEASE

FDA permits marketing of artificial intelligencebased device to detect certain diabetes-related eye problems

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For Immediate Release: April 11, 2018

Español

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration today permitted marketing of the first medical device to use artificial intelligence to detect greater than a mild level of the eye disease diabetic retinopathy in adults who have diabetes.

Diabetic retinopathy occurs when high levels of blood sugar lead to damage in the blood vessels of the retina, the light-sensitive tissue in the back of the eye. Diabetic retinopathy is the most common cause of vision loss among the more than 30 million Americans living with diabetes and the leading cause of vision impairment and blindness among working-age adults.

Automated cancer diagnosis with AI

International evaluation of an AI system for breast cancer screening

Scott Mayer McKinney 🖂, Marcin Sieniek, [...] Shravya Shetty 🖂

Nature **577**, 89–94(2020) Cite this article

51k Accesses | 112 Citations | 3501 Altmetric | Metrics

A Matters Arising to this article was published on 14 October 2020

1 An Addendum to this article was published on 14 October 2020

Abstract

Screening mammography aims to identify breast cancer at earlier stages of the disease, when treatment can be more successful¹. Despite the existence of screening programmes worldwide, the interpretation of mammograms is affected by high rates of false positives and false negatives². Here we present an artificial intelligence (AI) system that is capable of surpassing human experts in breast cancer prediction. To assess its performance in the clinical setting, we curated a

No more integrals?! AI can solve your maths homework!

MIT Technology Review

Computing

Facebook has a neural network that can do advanced math

Other neural nets haven't progressed beyond simple addition and multiplication, but this one calculates integrals and solves differential equations.

by Emerging Technology from the arXiv

December 17, 2019

DEEP LEARNING FOR SYMBOLIC MATHEMATICS

Guillaume Lample* Facebook AI Research glample@fb.com François Charton* Facebook AI Research fcharton@fb.com

Abstract

Neural networks have a reputation for being better at solving statistical or approximate problems than a terforming calculations or working with symbolic data. In this paper, we show that they can be surprisingly good at more elaborated tasks in mathematics, such as symbolic integration and solving differential equations. We propose a syntax for representing mathematical problems, and methods for generating large datasets that can bused to train sequence-to-sequence models. We achieve results that outperform commercial Computer Algebra Systems such as Matlab or Mathematica. Al replaces standard algorithms in medical imaging

Claim: "superior immunity to noise and a reduction in reconstruction artefacts compared with conventional handcrafted reconstruction methods"



well-defined steps. The data sensor encodes an

intermediate representation of the observed

show all

Image reconstruction is essential for imaging applications across the physical and life sciences, including optical and radar systems, magnetic resonance imaging, X-ray computed tomography, positron emission

A bold claim?!

nature > nature methods > research highlights > article	a natureresearch journal
nature methods	Search E-alert Submit Login
We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to imp	prove them. <u>Register your interest.</u>
Published: 27 April 2018	Download PDF 🕊
AI transforms image reconstruction	Sections References
Rita Strack	References
Nature Methods 15, 309(2018) Cite this article	Rights and permissions
1254 Accesses 2 Citations 8 Altmetric Metrics	About this article
	Further reading
A deep-learning-based approach improves the speed, accuracy, and	

revolutionize the way biologists acquire and interact with experimental data. In biomedical imaging, such approaches have largely been focused on improving and automating the analysis of acquired images. For example, machine learning has been used to address the challenging

Strong confidence in deep learning

The New Yorker (most influential magazine in the world) quotes Geoffrey Hinton (April 2017):

"They should stop training radiologists now."

An intriguing debate

Google's Ali Rahimi, winner of the Test-of-Time award 2017 (NeurIPS), "Machine learning has become alchemy. ... I would like to live in a society whose systems are built on top of verifiable, rigorous, thorough knowledge, and not on alchemy."



...


My take on Ali Rahimi's "Test of Time" award talk at NIPS.

Ali gave an entertaining and well-delivered talk. But I fundamentally disagree with the message.

The main message was, in essence, that the current practice in machine learning is akin to "alchemy" (his word).

It's insulting, yes. But never mind that: It's wrong!

An intriguing debate



Has artificial intelligence become alchemy?

Machine learning needs more rigor, scientists argue

By Matthew Hutson

Rahimi, a researcher in artificial intelligence (AI) at Google in San Francisco, California, took a swipe at his field last December-and received a 40-second ovation for it. Speaking at an AI conference. Rahimi charged data and the state of the state of the state

Without deep understanding of the basic tools needed to build and train new algorithms, he says, researchers creating AIs resort to hearsay like medieval alchemists. "People gravitate around cargo-cult practices," relying on "folklore and magic spells," adds Francois Chollet, a computer scientist at Google in Mountain View California.

Gradient descent relies on trial and error to optimize an algorithm, aiming for minima in a 3D landscape.

sults are "attributable entirely to other tricks

Rahimi offers several suggestions for learning which algorithms work best, and when. For starters, he says, researchers should conduct "ablation studies" like those done with the translation algorithm: deleting parts of an algorithm one at a time to see the function of each component. He calls for "sliced analysis," in which an algorithm's performance is analyzed in detail to see how improvement in some areas might have a cost elsewhere. And he says researchers should test their algorithms with many different conditions and settings, and should report performances for all of them.

Ben Recht, a computer scientist at the University of California, Berkeley, and coauthor of Rahimi's alchemy keynote talk, savs AI needs to borrow from physics, where researchers often shrink a problem down to a smaller "toy problem," "Physicists are amazing at devising simple experiments to root out explanations for phenomena," he says. Some AI researchers are already taking that approach, testing image recognition algorithms on small black-and-white handwritten characters before tackling large color photos, to better understand the algorithms' inner mechanics


Csaba Szepesvári, a computer scientist at DeepMind in London, says the field also and the second sec

Current challenges

It seems AI is unstoppable, but there are problems with current technologies

- Explainability
- Theoretical guarantees
- Stability (e.g. adversarial examples)

Later: Aspects of explainability and theoretical guarantees. Next: Case study of stability (or, rather, lack thereof)...



Deep learning for decision problems

Deep learning for classification

Object: a classification function $f : \mathbb{R}^d \to \{0, 1\}$ **What we are given:** a training set $\mathcal{T} = \{(x^1, f(x^1)), \dots, (x^r, f(x^r))\} \subset \mathbb{R}^d \times \{0, 1\}.$ **Goal:** find a "good" approximation $\tilde{f} : \mathbb{R}^d \to \{0, 1\}$ to f.

Test \tilde{f} on a classification (or a test) set $\mathcal{C} = \{y^1, \ldots, y^s\}$. Success is measured by

$$\frac{|\{y^j \in \mathcal{C} \mid f(y^j) = \tilde{f}(y^j)\}|}{s}$$

https://towardsdatascience.com/10-papers-you-should-read-to-understand-image- classificationin-the-deep-learning-era-4b9d792f45a7 Fawzi, A., Moosavi-Dezfooli, S.M. and Frossard, P., 2017. *The robustness of deep networks: A geometrical perspective.* IEEE Signal Processing Magazine. Shalev-Shwartz, S. and Ben-David, S., 2014. *Understanding machine learning: From theory to algorithms.* Cambridge university press.

Neural networks (NNs)

Let \mathcal{NN}_N , with $\mathbf{N} = (N_L, N_{L-1}, \dots, N_1, N_0 = d)$ denote the set of all *L*-layer neural networks. That is, all mappings $\phi : \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}^{N_L}$ of the form

$$\phi(x) = V_L(\rho(V_{L-1}(\rho(\ldots \rho(V_1(x)))))), \quad x \in \mathbb{R}^d.$$

$$V_j y = W_j y + b_j, \qquad W_j \in \mathbb{R}^{N_j imes N_{j-1}}, \quad b_j \in \mathbb{R}^{N_j}$$


Here $\rho: \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ is some non-linear function that acts pointwise on a vector.

NB: Other architectures are possible, e.g. skip connections, different ρ 's etc.

Reference for definition of NN: Pinkus, A., 1999. *Approximation theory of the MLP model in neural networks*. Acta numerica, 8(1), 143-195.

Common choices of ρ

 $\rho \colon \mathbb{R} \to \mathbb{R}$ acts elementwise on a vector.



Approximation qualities of neural nets

Theorem (Universal Approximation Theorem)

Let $\rho \in C(\mathbb{R})$ and assume that ρ is not a polynomial. Let $K \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ be compact, $f \in C(K)$ and $\epsilon > 0$. Then there exists a neural network (with on hidden layer) ϕ such that

$$\sup_{x\in K} |\phi(x) - f(x)| \le \epsilon.$$

Theorem (Universal Interpolation Theorem)

Let $\rho \in C(\mathbb{R})$ and assume that ρ is not a polynomial. For any k distinct points $\{x_j\}_{j=1}^k \subset \mathbb{R}^d$ and associated data $\{\alpha_j\}_{j=1}^k \subset \mathbb{R}$. Then there exists a neural network (with on hidden layer) ϕ such that

$$\phi(x_j) = \alpha_j, \qquad j = 1, \ldots, k.$$

Gühring, I., Kutyniok, G. and Petersen, P., 2020. *Error bounds for approximations with deep ReLU neural networks in W^{s,p} norms.* Analysis and Applications, 18(05), pp.803-859. Pinkus, A., 1999. *Approximation theory of the MLP model in neural networks.* Acta numerica, 143-195.

Approximation qualities of neural nets

A zoo of so-called "universal approximation" theorems. However, this is not enough:

- (a) Other methods (e.g. polynomials, splines, wavelets, etc.) have universal approximation theorems. Why are NNs so effective? E.g., are there useful classes of functions that are efficiently approximated by NNs but not classical methods?
- (b) We want to construct or compute a good neural network. There is a subtle difference between existence and computability (more on this later).

We will focus on point (b). For point (a) (which is largely open) see:

DeVore, R., Hanin, B. and Petrova, G., 2020. *Neural Network Approximation*. arXiv preprint arXiv:2012.14501.

Training Neural Networks

Let $\theta \in \mathbb{R}^n$ be the weights of a neural network $\phi(\cdot, \theta) \in \mathcal{NN}_{N}$.

Given a classification function $f : \mathbb{R}^d \to \{0, 1\}$, a training set $\mathcal{T} = \{x^1, \ldots, x^r\} \subset \mathbb{R}^d$, a cost function $C : \mathbb{R}^{N_L} \times \mathbb{R}^{N_L} \to \mathbb{R}_+$, and seek to minimize

$$\underset{\theta \in \mathbb{R}^n}{\operatorname{minimize}} L(\theta) \coloneqq \sum_{i=1}^r C(\phi(x^j, \theta), f(x^j)),$$

using gradient based methods

$$\theta_{i+1} = \theta_i - \eta \nabla_{\theta} L(\theta_i)$$

This has been a HUGE empirical success!

(i) There does not exist a neural network that approximates the function we are interested in.

(ii) (iii)

(i) There does not exist a neural network that approximates the function we are interested in.

(ii) (iii)

- (i) There does not exist a neural network that approximates the function we are interested in.
- (ii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, however, there does not exist an algorithm that can construct the neural network.(iii)

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- (ii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, however, there does not exist an algorithm that can construct the neural network.
- (iii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, and an algorithm to construct it. However, the algorithm will need prohibitively many samples.

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- (ii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, however, there does not exist an algorithm that can construct the neural network.
- (iii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, and an algorithm to construct it. However, the algorithm will need prohibitively many samples.

What could go wrong?

- (i) There does not exist a neural network that approximates the function we are interested in.
- (ii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, however, there does not exist an algorithm that can construct the neural network.
- (iii) There does exist a neural network that approximates the function, and an algorithm to construct it. However, the algorithm will need prohibitively many samples.

NB: There is a mathematical theory suggesting that neural nets have all the approximation qualities that are needed.

We'll see examples of (ii) and (iii) later.

AI Generated Hallucinations – Instabilities in Deep Learning



hear a concerto as someone's voice, which is raising concerns about using artificial intelligence in the real world.

AI Generated Hallucinations in classification/decision problems

Adversarial attacks on medical machine learning

Samuel G. Finlayson¹, John D. Bowers², Joichi Ito³, Jonathan L. Zittrain², Andrew L. Beam⁴, Isaac S. Kohane¹

+ See all authors and affiliations

Science 22 Mar 2019: Vol. 363, Issue 6433, pp. 1287-1289 DOI: 10.1126/science.aaw4399


Article	Figures & Data	Info & Metrics	eLetters	🔁 PDF
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With public and academic attention increasingly focused on the new role of machine learning in the health information economy, an unusual and no-longer-esoteric category of vulnerabilities in machine-learning systems could prove important. These vulnerabilities allow a small, carefully designed change in how inputs are presented to a system to completely alter its output, causing it to confidently arrive at manifestly wrong conclusions. These advanced techniques to subvert otherwise-reliable machine-learning systems—so-called adversarial attacks—have, to date, been of interest primarily to computer science researchers (1). However, the landscape of often-competing interests within health care, and billions of dollars at stake in systems' outputs, implies considerable problems. We outline motivations that various players in the health care system may have to use adversarial attacks and begin a discussion of what to do about them. Far from discouraging continued innovation with medical machine learning, we call for active engagement of medical, technical, legal, and ethical experts in pursuit of efficient, broadly available, and effective health care that machine learning will enable.

AI Generated Hallucinations in classification/decision problems

The anatomy of an adversarial attack

Demonstration of how adversarial attacks against various medical AI systems might be executed without requiring any overtly fraudulent misrepresentation of the data.



AI Generated Hallucinations – Instabilities in Deep Learning

Intriguing properties of neural networks

Christian Szegedy	Wojciech Zaremba	Ilya Sutskeve	r Joan Bruna
Google Inc.	New York University	Google Inc.	New York University
Dumitru Erhan	Ian Goodfel	low	Rob Fergus
Google Inc.	University of M	ontreal	New York University
			Facebook Inc.

Abstract

Deep neural networks are highly expressive models that have recently achieved state of the art performance on speech and visual recognition tasks. While their expressiveness is the reason they succeed, it also causes them to learn uninterpretable solutions that could have counter-intuitive properties. In this paper we report two such properties.

First, we find that there is no distinction between individual high level units and random linear combinations of high level units, according to various methods of unit analysis. It suggests that it is the space, rather than the individual units, that **Deep Fool**

Deep Fool was established at EPFL in order to study the stability of neural networks.

DEEP LEARNING FOR VISUAL UNDERSTANDING

Alhussein Fawzi, Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, and Pascal Frossard

The Robustness of Deep Networks

A geometrical perspective

Reading material

- Fawzi, A., Moosavi-Dezfooli, S. M., Frossard, P. (2017). 'The robustness of deep networks: A geometrical perspective'. IEEE Signal Processing Magazine, 34(6), 50-62.
- Moosavi-Dezfooli, S. M., Fawzi, A., Frossard, P. (2016). 'Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition', (pp. 2574-2582).
- Moosavi-Dezfooli, S. M., Fawzi, A., Fawzi, O., Frossard, P. (2017). 'Universal adversarial perturbations'. In Proceedings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition (pp. 1765-1773).
- Kanbak, C., Moosavi-Dezfooli, S. M., Frossard, P. (2018). 'Geometric robustness of deep networks: analysis and improvement'. In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (pp. 4441-4449).

Deep Fool in practice




FIGURE 1. An example of an adversarial perturbations in state-of-the-art neural networks. (a) The original image that is classified as a "whale," (b) the perturbed image classified as a "turtle," and (c) the corresponding adversarial perturbation that has been added to the original image to fool a state-of-the-art image classifier [5].

Deep Fool: Universal perturbations




FIGURE 3. Universal perturbations computed for different deep neural network architectures. The pixel values are scaled for visibility. (a) CaffeNet, (b) VGG-F, (c) VGG-16, (d) VGG-19, (e) GoogLeNet, and (f) ResNet-152.

Deep Fool: Examples



FIGURE 4. Examples of natural images perturbed with the universal perturbation and their corresponding estimated labels with GoogLeNet. (a)–(h) Images belonging to the ILSVRC 2012 validation set. (i)–(I) Personal images captured by a mobile phone camera. (Figure used courtesy of [22].)

Deep Fool: Examples

	VGG-F	CaffeNet	GoogLeNet	VGG-16	VGG-19	ResNet-152
VGG-F	93.7%	71.8%	48.4%	42.1%	42.1%	47.4%
CaffeNet	74.0%	93.3%	47.7%	39.9%	39.9%	48.0%
GoogLeNet	46.2%	43.8%	78.9%	39.2%	39.8%	45.5%
VGG-16	63.4%	55.8%	56.5%	78.3%	73.1%	63.4%
VGG-19	64.0%	57.2%	53.6%	73.5%	77.8%	58.0%
ResNet-152	46.3%	46.3%	50.5%	47.0%	45.5%	84.0%

Table: The rows indicate the architecture for which the universal perturbations is computed, and the columns indicate the architecture for which the fooling rate is reported.

Structural perturbations

Robust Physical-World Attacks on Deep Learning Visual Classification

Kevin Eykholt^{*1}, Ivan Evtimov^{*2}, Earlence Fernandes², Bo Li³, Amir Rahmati⁴, Chaowei Xiao¹, Atul Prakash¹, Tadayoshi Kohno², and Dawn Song³

> ¹University of Michigan, Ann Arbor ²University of Washington ³University of California, Berkeley ⁴Samsung Research America and Stony Brook University

Abstract

Recent studies show that the state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to adversarial examples, resulting from small-magnitude perturbations added to the input. Given that that emerging physical systems are using DNNs in safety-critical situations, adversarial examples could mislead these systems and cause dangerous situations. these successes, they are increasingly being used as part of control pipelines in physical systems such as cars [8, 17], UAVs [4, 24], and robots [40]. Recent work, however, has demonstrated that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations [5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 22, 25, 29, 30, 35]. These carefully crafted modifications to the (visual) input of DNNs can cause the systems they control to misbehave in unexpected and potentially dangerous ways.

Structural perturbations



Structural perturbations can also cause the network to fail.

How do we compute additive adversarial perturbations?

Notation

- $f : \mathbb{R}^d \to [0, 1]^C$ Neural network classifier.
- $\hat{k} : \mathbb{R}^d \to \{1, 2, \dots, C\}$. Predicted label.

$$\hat{k}(x) = \operatorname{argmax}_{j \in \{1,\dots,C\}} f(x)_j.$$

Seeking minimal perturbation changing the prediction

$$r^*(x) \in \operatorname{argmin}_{r \in \mathbb{R}^d} \|r\|$$
 subject to $\hat{k}(x+r) \neq \hat{k}(x)$

Otter: 0.993142 Beaver: 0.00231697 Mink: 0.00199465

Random Noise

-

1. Draw
$$v \sim \mathcal{N}(0, \mathsf{Id})$$
 (normal distibution)
2. Solve
 $\alpha^* \in \operatorname{argmin}_{\alpha > 0} \alpha$ subject to $\hat{k}(x + \alpha v) \neq \hat{k}(x)$
3. Set $r^* = \alpha^* v$

Random Noise



$$||r||_{l^2}/||x||_{l^2} = 1.47$$

Fast Gradient

1. Let
$$L(s) = \|f(x+s) - f(x)\|_{l^2}^2$$
.
2. Let $v = \nabla_s L$
3. Solve
 $\alpha^* \in \operatorname{argmin}_{\alpha > 0} \alpha$ subject to $\hat{k}(x + \alpha v) \neq \hat{k}(x)$
4. Set $r^* = \alpha^* v$

Fast Gradient



$$||r||_{l^2}/||x||_{l^2} = 0.34$$

Deep Fool



 $||r||_{l^2}/||x||_{l^2} = 0.0052$

Binary classification:

Given a classification function $f \colon \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}$ and an image $x_0 \in \mathbb{R}^d$ we would like to solve

 $r^*(x_0) \in \operatorname{argmin} \|r\|_{l^2}$ subject to $\operatorname{sign}(f(x_0 + r)) \neq \operatorname{sign}(f(x_0))$

We make the classification based on $sign(f(x_0))$.

Deep Fool for Binary Linear Classifier

Let $f : \mathbb{R}^d \to \mathbb{R}$ be given by $f(x) = w^T x + b$.




Figure: Adversarial example for a binary linear classifier

Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to fool deep neural networks (2016), S.M. Moosavi-Dezfooli et al.

Deep Fool for Binary Classifier

We would like to solve

 $r^*(x_0) \in \operatorname{argmin} \|r\|_{l^2}$ subject to $\operatorname{sign}(f(x_0+r)) \neq \operatorname{sign}(f(x_0))$


Approximate f at x_i with an linear version $f(x_i) + \nabla f(x_i)^T (x - x_i)$.

- 1: **Input:** *image x*, *classifer f*
- 2: **Output:** Perturbation \tilde{r}
- 3: Initialize: $x_0 \leftarrow x, i \leftarrow 0, \eta \leftarrow 0.02, \tilde{r} \leftarrow 0$
- 4: while $\operatorname{sign}(f(x + (1 + \eta)\tilde{r})) = \operatorname{sign}(f(x))$ do
- 5: $r_i \leftarrow -\frac{f(x_i)}{\|\nabla f(x_i)\|_{\ell^2}^2} \nabla f(x_i)$
- 6: $x_{i+1} \leftarrow x_i + r_i$
- 7: $\tilde{r} \leftarrow \tilde{r} + r_i$
- 8: $i \leftarrow i+1$

9: return \tilde{r}

Deep Fool for Multiclass Linear Classifier

Let



Is the behaviour we are seeing reasonable?

Consider a linear classifier $w^{\top}x + b$ in \mathbb{R}^d . Then

$$w^{\top}(x + \Delta x) + b = w^{\top}x + w^{\top}\Delta x + b$$

Under the constraint $\|\Delta x\|_{l^{\infty}} \leq \epsilon$ we can choose $\Delta x_i = \epsilon \operatorname{sign}(w_i)$ so the classification changes by

 $\epsilon \|w\|_{l^1} \approx \epsilon \, d \, \langle |w| \rangle$

where $\langle |w| \rangle$ is the avrage of the entries in w.

What happens for large d?

Insight from: Goodfellow, I. J., Shlens, J., & Szegedy, C. (2014). '*Explaining and harnessing adversarial examples*'. arXiv preprint arXiv:1412.6572.



European Commission > Strategy > Shaping Europe's digital future > Reports and studies >

Shaping Europe's digital future

REPORT / STUDY | 8 April 2019

Ethics guidelines for trustworthy AI

On 8 April 2019, the High-Level Expert Group on AI presented Ethics Guidelines for Trustworthy Artificial Intelligence. This followed the publication of the guidelines' first draft in December 2018 on which more than 500 comments were received through an open consultation.

According to the Guidelines, trustworthy AI should be: (1) lawful - respecting all applicable laws and regulations (2) ethical - respecting ethical principles and values (3) robust - both from a technical perspective while taking into account its social environment



TRUSTWORTHY AI ASSESSMENT LIST (PILOT VERSION)

1. Human agency and oversight

Fundamental rights:

- Did you carry out a fundamental rights impact assessment where there could be a negative impact on fundamental rights? Did you identify and document potential trade-offs made between the different principles and rights?
- Does the AI system interact with decisions by human (end) users (e.g. recommended actions or decisions to take, presenting of options)?
 - Could the AI system affect human autonomy by interfering with the (end) user's decision-making process in an unintended way?
 - Did you consider whether the AI system should communicate to (end) users that a decision, content, advice or outcome is the result of an algorithmic decision?
 - In case of a chat bot or other conversational system, are the human end users made aware that they are interacting with a non-human agent?

Human agency:

- Is the AI system implemented in work and labour process? If so, did you consider the task allocation between the AI system and humans for meaningful interactions and appropriate human oversight and control?
 - Does the AI system enhance or augment human capabilities?
 - Did you take safeguards to prevent overconfidence in or overreliance on the AI system for work processes?

Human oversight:



Adversarial Examples Are Not Bugs, They Are Features

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Logan Engstrom*	Brandon Tran	Aleksander Madry

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Abstract

Adversarial examples have attracted significant attention in machine learning, but the reasons for their existence and pervasiveness remain unclear. We demonstrate that adversarial examples can be directly attributed to the presence of *non-robust features*: features (derived from patterns in the data distribution) that are highly predictive, yet brittle and (thus) incomprehensible to humans. After capturing these features within a theoretical framework, we establish their widespread existence in standard datasets. Finally, we present a simple setting where we can rigorously tie the phenomena we observe in practice to a *misalignment* between the (human-specified) notion of robustness and the inherent geometry of the data.

1 Introduction

The pervasive brittleness of deep neural networks [Sze+14; Eng+19b; HD19; Ath+18] has attracted significant attention in recent years. Particularly worrisome is the phenomenon of *adversarial examples* [Big+13;

What do AI algorithms actually learn? – On false structures in deep learning

Laura Thesing^{*} Vegard Antun[†] Anders C. Hansen^{* †}

June 5, 2019

Abstract

There are two big unsolved mathematical questions in artificial intelligence (AI): (1) Why is deep learning so successful in classification problems and (2) why are neural nets based on deep learning at the same time universally unstable, where the instabilities make the networks vulnerable to adversarial attacks. We present a solution to these questions that can be summed up in two words: false structures. Indeed, deep learning does not learn the original structures that humans use when recognising images (cats have whiskers, paws, fur, pointy ears, etc), but rather different false structures that correlate with the original structure and hence yield the success. However, the false structure, unlike the original structure, is unstable. The false structure is simpler than the original structure, hence easier to learn with less data and the numerical algorithm used in the training will more easily converge to the neural network that captures the false structure. We formally define the concept of false structures and formulate the solution as a conjecture. Given that trained neural networks always are computed with approximations, this conjecture can only be established through a combination of theoretical and computational results similar to how one establishes a postulate in theoretical physics (e.g. the speed of light is constant). Establishing the conjecture fully will require a vast research program characterising the false structures. We provide the foundations for such a program establishing the existence of the false structures in practice. Finally, we discuss the far reaching consequences the existence of the false structures has on state-of-the-art AI and Smale's 18th problem.

Clever Hans

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For Grimm's tale, see Clever Hans (fairy tale).

This article **needs additional citations for verification**. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. *Find sources:* "Clever Hans" – news · newspapers · books · scholar · JSTOR (December 2020) (Learn how and when to remove this template message)

Clever Hans (German: *der Kluge Hans*; fl. 1907) was a horse that was claimed to have performed arithmetic and other intellectual tasks. After a formal investigation in 1907, psychologist Oskar Pfungst demonstrated that the horse was not actually performing these mental tasks, but was watching the reactions of his trainer. He discovered this artifact in the research methodology, wherein the horse was responding directly to involuntary



Clever Hans performing in 1904

Can we check what the neural networks learn?

Explanations can be manipulated and geometry is to blame

Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski¹, Maximilian Alber¹, Christopher J. Anders¹, Marcel Ackermann², Klaus-Robert Müller^{1,3,4}, Pan Kessel¹

¹Machine Learning Group, EE & Computer Science Faculty, TU-Berlin ²Department of Video Coding & Analytics, Fraunhofer Heinrich-Hertz-Institute ³Max Planck Institute for Informatics ⁴Department of Brain and Cognitive Engineering, Korea University {klaus-robert.mueller, pan.kessel}@tu-berlin.de

Abstract

Explanation methods aim to make neural networks more trustworthy and interpretable. In this paper, we demonstrate a property of explanation methods which is disconcerting for both of these purposes. Namely, we show that explanations can be manipulated *arbitrarily* by applying visually hardly perceptible perturbations to the input that keep the network's output approximately constant. We establish theoretically that this phenomenon can be related to certain geometrical properties of neural networks. This allows us to derive an upper bound on the susceptibility of explanations to manipulations. Based on this result, we propose effective mechanisms to enhance the robustness of explanations.

Can we check what the neural networks learn?



Figure 1: Original image with corresponding explanation map on the left. Manipulated image with its explanation on the right. The chosen target explanation was an image with a text stating "this explanation was manipulated".

The need for foundations.

Echoes of an old story

Hilbert's vision at start of 20th century: provide secure foundations for all mathematics.


- All mathematical statements should be written in a precise formal language, and manipulated according to well defined rules.
- Completeness: a proof that all true mathematical statements can be proved in the formalism.
- Consistency: a proof that no contradiction can be obtained in the formalism of mathematics.
- Decidability: an algorithm for deciding the truth or falsity of any mathematical statement.



Hilbert's 10th problem: *Provide an algorithm which, for any given Diophantine equation (polynomial equation with integer coefficients and finite number of unknowns), can decide whether the equation has an integer-valued solution.*

E.g.: $x^n + y^n = z^n$ (c.f. Fermat's last theorem)

Echoes of an old story



Gödel and Turing turned Hilbert's optimism upside down by showing how there are true statements in mathematics that cannot be proven and that there are problems that cannot be computed by an algorithm.

Hilbert's 10th problem (Solution in 1970, Matiyasevich): No such algorithm exists.

Poonen, B., 2014. Undecidable problems: a sampler. Interpreting Gödel: Critical Essays.

A discussion with Fields Medalist Artur Avila

Many scientists from a broad spectrum of areas have expressed various views and opinions about the possible future consequences of the advancement of AI, do you have any views on this?

Being a dynamicist, my training has taught me to a large extent that there are a lot of limitations when we make predictions. To my understanding, when it comes to AI peoples' hopes might be too high at the moment... It is of course correct to continue the effort... When we learn more about a corresponding domain we are also able to better understand its limitations. The point is to try to discover directions where the techniques allow you to go. It is very important and at the same time difficult to know what you cannot achieve... This is what happened in mathematics when we learned that there are unsolvable problems and all kind of limitations to formalism. Our understanding changed completely from Hilbert to Gödel... Maybe, with respect to AI, there are still unknown theoretical limitations hiding in information theory or even dynamical systems.

Full interview: http://www.mthrassias.com/data/uploads/avila_discussion.pdf

A program for the foundations of DL and Al

Smale's 18th problem*: What are the limits of artificial intelligence?

A program determining the foundations/limitations of deep learning and AI is needed:

- Boundaries of methodologies.
- Universal/intrinsic boundaries (no algorithm can do it).

There is a key difference between existence and construction here.

Need to also incorporate two pillars of numerical analysis:

- Stability (warning to the reader: there are different types of stability)
- Accuracy

GOAL for rest of lectures: Develop some results in this direction for inverse problems.

*Steve Smale composed a list of problems for the 21st century in reply to a request of Vladimir Arnold inspired by Hilbert's list.

Al in inverse problems and imaging.

Mathematical setup


Given measurements y = Ax + e recover $x \in \mathbb{C}^N$.


•
$$x \in \mathbb{C}^N$$
 be an unknown vector,

▶
$$A \in \mathbb{C}^{m \times N}$$
 be a matrix $(m < N)$ describing modality (e.g. MRI), and

•
$$y = Ax + e$$
 the noisy measurements of x.


AI generated hallucinations - Instabilities





Network from: J. Schlemper, J. Caballero, J. V. Hajnal, A. Price and D. Rueckert, 'A deep cascade of convolutional neural networks for MR image reconstruction', in International conference on information processing in medical imaging, Springer, 2017, pp. 647–658. Figures from: Antun, V., Renna, F., Poon, C., Adcock, B., & Hansen, A. C., 'On instabilities of deep learning in image reconstruction and the potential costs of Al'. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 2020.


AI generated hallucinations - Instabilities




 $|\mathbf{M}(A)| = |\mathbf{M}|$

Network from: J. Schlemper, J. Caballero, J. V. Hajnal, A. Price and D. Rueckert, 'A deep cascade of convolutional neural networks for MR image reconstruction', in International conference on information processing in medical imaging, Springer, 2017, pp. 647–658. Figures from: Antun, V., Renna, F., Poon, C., Adcock, B., & Hansen, A. C., 'On instabilities of deep learning in image reconstruction and the potential costs of AI'. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA, 2020.

DL is unstable in inverse problems



The press reports on instabilities



Curt Langlotz (Director of the Center for Artificial Intelligence in Medicine and Imaging at Stanford University) tweets:

"Confirming what many believed about deep learning image reconstruction: 'Deep learning typically yields unstable methods for image reconstruction from: 1) tiny perturbations, 2) structural changes, and 3) changes in the number of samples.""

Given the existence of stable and accurate methods, isn't this a paradox?
There is a trade-off between stability and accuracy.

Recall the claim

Claim: "superior immunity to noise and a reduction in reconstruction artefacts compared with conventional handcrafted reconstruction methods"

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We'd like to understand how you use our websites in order to improve them. Register your interest.							
Published: 27 April 2018							

Imaging AI transforms image reconstruction

Rita Strack

 Nature Methods
 15, 309(2018)
 Cite this article


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A deep-learning-based approach improves the speed, accuracy, and robustness of biomedical image reconstruction.


Artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning are poised to revolutionize the way biologists acquire and interact with experimental

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
AUTOMAP |x|




 $\Psi(Ax)$




FIRENET




 $\Phi(Ax)$




AUTOMAP $|x + r_1|$




$\Psi(A(x+r_1))$




FIRENET $|x + v_1|$




 $\Phi(A(x+v_1))$




AUTOMAP $|x + r_2|$




$\Psi(A(x+r_2))$




FIRENET $|x + v_2|$




 $\Phi(A(x+v_2))$




AUTOMAP $|x + r_3|$




$\Psi(A(x+r_3))$



FIRENET $|x + v_3|$



 $\Phi(A(x+v_3))$



Tune in next time for...

- ► AI generated hallucinations: The instability test for AI image reconstruction.
- Reasons for instability (kernel awareness).
- An intriguing impossibility result in optimisation and sparse regularisation. (well-conditioned problems where great neural networks exist but cannot be computed/trained)
- Algorithm unrolling.

DAY I	DAY II Day III	
Gravity of AI	Inverse Problems	Achieving Kernel Awareness
Image Classification	Instabilities & Kernel Awareness	FIRENETs
Need for Foundations	Intriguing Barriers	Imaging Applications
AI for Image Reconstruction	Algorithm Unrolling	Numerical Examples