Hvordan analysere avhengigheter

Seminar om skjulte avhengigheter i komplekse systemer

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Heidi E. I. Dahl

Motivation

- How to modularize threat modelling
- How to deal with mutual dependencies in threat modelling of complex systems

Problem of risk analysis

- Systems
  - are complex
  - mutually dependent
  - cross national borders
  - are continuously updated
- You never have full access to all documentation
- And even if you had, there would just be too much of it

Reductionist approach to the modeling of threat scenarios

- I will illustrate the approach on CORAS
- CORAS is
  - a method for model-driven security risk analysis
  - a graphical language
    - for structured brainstorming and analysis
    - semantics defined as schematic translation of diagrams into English
  - a tool
- You may do likewise with your favorite threat scenario modeling language – (or your favorite risk table)

Approach

- Extend the graphical CORAS language to cope with context dependencies
  - We refer to the extended language as **Dependent CORAS**
- Update the semantics of the CORAS language to deal with context dependencies
- Define rules to reason about context dependencies
- Define rules for simplifying composed scenarios

One Step Back: What is Security Risk Analysis?



Threat Diagram



Semantics: Translation into English

- Vertices
  - ”Hacker” is a deliberate threat.
  - Threat scenario ”Power supply in Norway breaks down” occurs with undefined likelihood.
  - Threat scenario ”Power supply in Sweden breaks down” occurs with likelihood ”1:5 years”.
  - Unwanted incident ”Blackout in Norway” occurs with likelihood ”3:100 years”.
  - ”Power production in Norway” is an asset.
- Relations
  - Hacker initiates ”Power supply in Norway breaks down” with likelihood ”1:100” years.
  - ”Power supply in Norway breaks down” leads to ”Blackout in Norway” with conditional likelihood ”1.0”.
  - ”Power supply in Sweden breaks down” leads to ”Blackout in Norway” with conditional likelihood ”0.1”.
  - ”Power supply in Norway breaks down” impacts ”Power production in Norway” with consequence ”critical”.

Checking Likelihoods



[1:100 years] + [1:50 years] = [3:100 years]

Dependent Diagram



Semantics of Dependent Diagram

- $[[C \triangleright T]]$:=

  [[T]]
  assuming
  [[C]]
  to the extent there are explicit dependencies



Independence of Context

$C \ddagger T$: T is independent of C if there are no paths from C to T



Rule of Independence

$$\frac{C \triangleright T \quad C \ddagger T}{\triangleright T}$$



Modus Ponens

$$\frac{C \triangleright T \quad \triangleright C}{\triangleright T}$$



Applying the Deduction Rules



The Combined Diagram




Blackout in southern Norway
Power market
High export from area [1:1years]
High load on transmission corridor
Protection failure
1.0
Transmission line outage [1:1year]
0.1
Grid overload causes multiple outages in export area [1:10years]
0.5
Minor export area blackout in Norway [1:20years]
moderate
critical
Power production in Norway
Lack of rain in Norway
Low hydro availability [1:5years]
1.0
High import from Sweden [1:5years]
High load on transmission corridor
0.4
Grid overload causes multiple outages [1:10years]
Failed area protection
0.5
Total area blackout [1:20years]
0.1
0.4
0.4
Blackout in southern Sweden
Cold weather
Interface bottleneck
Outage of two or more transmission lines in the north/south corridor [1: 1year]
Failed load shedding
0.07
Grid overload causes multiple outages [1:10years]
Failed area protection
0.5
Blackout in southern Sweden [1:20years]
critical
moderate
Power production in Sweden
Technical failure
Reduced nuclear availability [1:20years]
0.01
Minor area blackout [1:20years]
1.0
Lack of rain in Sweden
Low hydro availability [1:5years]
1.0
Capacity shortage [1:4years]
0.4
Unstable network [1:10years]
0.2
SINTEF
ICT
17


Blackout in southern Sweden and Norway
Power market
High export from area [1:1years]
High load on transmission corridor
Protection failure
1.0
Transmission line outage [1:1year]
0.1
Grid overload causes multiple outages in export area [1:10years]
0.5
Minor export area blackout in Norway [1:20years]
moderate
critical
Power production in Norway
Lack of rain in Norway
Low hydro availability [1:5years]
1.0
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Grid overload causes multiple outages [1:10years]
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0.4
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Capacity shortage [1:4years]
0.4
Unstable network [1:10years]
0.2
SINTEF
ICT
18

Leads-to composition

$$\frac{v_1(f) \quad v_1 \xrightarrow{l} v_2}{(v_1 \sqcap v_2)(f \cdot l)}$$





Transitivity

$$\frac{v_1 \xrightarrow{l_1} v_2 \qquad v_2 \xrightarrow{l_2} v_3}{v_1 \xrightarrow{l_1 \cdot l_2} (v_3 \cap v_2)}$$





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



Composing impact relations to composite asset

$$\frac{v \xrightarrow{c_1} a_1 \qquad v \xrightarrow{c_2} a_2}{v \xrightarrow{c_1 \oplus c_2} (a_1 \cup a_2)}$$





Composing mutually exclusive vertices

$$\frac{v_1(f_1) \quad v_2(f_2)}{(v_1 \sqcup v_2)(f_1 + f_2)}$$





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



Leads-to composition

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



Conclusions

We have

- argued the need for a reductionist approach to risk analysis
- outlined a generic strategy to facilitate modular threat modelling
- illustrated the generic strategy on the CORAS language

Resources: http://coras.sourceforge.net/

- Downloads
  - The CORAS diagram editor
  - The CORAS icons (Visio stencil, PNG, SVG)
- Publications:
  - Folker den Braber, Ida Hogganvik, Mass Soldal Lund, Ketil Stølen, and Fredrik Vraalsen. **Model-based security analysis in seven steps – a guided tour to the CORAS method.** BT Technology Journal, 25(1): 101 – 117, 2007.
  - Ida Hogganvik. **A graphical approach to security risk analysis.** PhD thesis, Faculty of Mathematics and Natural Sciences, University of Oslo, 2007.
  - Gyrd Brændeland, Heidi E.I. Dahl, Iselin Engan, Ketil Stølen. **Using dependent CORAS diagrams to analyse mutual dependency.** To appear in Proc. 2nd International Workshop on Critical Information Infrastructure Security (CRITIS'2007).

Questions?

Heidi E. I. Dahl
SINTEF ICT
Cooperative and Trusted Systems
heidi.dahl@sintef.no